Category Archives: race, gender, class, ethnicity

Kimani Gray: Guilty Until Proven Innocent

Protestors at a vigil for Kimani Gray
Demonstrator Fatimah Shakur speaks during a vigil held for Kimani Gray in East Flatbush, Brooklyn, on Wednesday, March 13, 2013. The 16-year-old was shot to death on a Brooklyn street last Saturday night by plainclothes police officers. (AP Photo/John Minchillo)
The only thing anyone can agree upon is that on Saturday, March 9, 16-year-old Kimani Gray was shot seven times by two New York Police Department officers in East Flatbush, Brooklyn. The police fired eleven shots. Four hit him in the front and side of his body, three in the back.

Gray’s mother says he and his friends were on their way back from a birthday party. Police saw a gang. A neighbor watching from a window says Gray was unarmed, and multiple witnesses say that Gray pleaded for his life. Police say he pulled a loaded gun. Some media reports say the officers were highly decorated for bravery. Other reports note that they had cost the department more than $215,000 in payouts for at least five lawsuits alleging civil rights violations. Police say they found a gun at the scene. A witness says she never saw a gun, and skeptics wonder whether it was a “drop” by corrupt officers.

Sharing the headlines with Kimani Gray was an upcoming trial to decide a class action lawsuit contesting the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program. One plaintiff has been stopped twenty-eight times. Of those stopped, 90 percent are black or Latino; 90 percent of stop-and-frisks result in no arrest. Many white New Yorkers, including the mayor, praise the program as having lowered the crime rate and clamped down on guns. But criminologists and the New York Civil Liberties Union, supported by FBI data, dispute any causal connection: crime has gone down by the same rates all over the United States, and in cities with no such aggressive policy. And black New Yorkers, particularly those in targeted neighborhoods, cite the living-under-lockdown difficulties of just getting to work or school on time when one is stopped, yelled at, searched—over and over and over again.

Then there were the headlines about the NRA’s Wayne LaPierre giving a “fiery” speech at the annual meeting of the Conservative Political Action Conference in National Harbor, Maryland. His references were laced with light racial code, assuming his overwhelmingly white audience was innately and easily distinguishable from “gangs” and the denizens of Chicago. Invoking the language of “stand your ground” laws, he urged them to “take your own stand. Plant your feet firmly in the foundation of freedom.”

What if LaPierre and his audience had been black? After all, young African-American men are most likely to be the innocent victims of gunfire and, in principle, most likely to have cause to invoke self-defense. Of course, a black man expressing such public zeal for weaponry—and riling up a cheering base, no less—without immediate and repressive consequence is harder to imagine. But as long as we’re trying, imagine a world of equal opportunity where LaPierre’s white audience members were as likely to be stopped and frisked on their way out the door of the convention hall.

The degree to which race and geography have become an overly capacious proxy for narratives of criminality is highlighted by yet another story that unfolded soon after Kimani Gray’s death. Baby Survives Harlem Mother’s Death Leap, read a New York Post headline about a woman who committed suicide by leaping eight floors to her death. It is the word “Harlem” that instantly shapes the assumptions about what happened: she must be black, desperately poor, a bad mother, probably on drugs. On its website, the Daily News headlined the same story “Manhattan mother jumps eight stories to her death with her infant son strapped to her chest; baby survives with minor injuries.” With “Manhattan” as the modifier, this mother was more likely to be seen as selfish, desperately ambitious and not on enough drugs for what was assumed to be postpartum depression. It turned out that she was a white employee of the Manhattan State Supreme Court and a graduate of Columbia Law School. (Of course, there was a stereotyped narrative for that as well: Glenn Beck’s news site, The Blaze, reported the story as Lawyer Mother Leaps From 8-Story Building. Commentary from readers was peppered with surmise about whether the woman was a feminazi with a liberal death wish and with relief that there was one less lawyer in the world.)

A consistent theme in all these disparate news stories is the demise of the presumption of innocence. For those in already criminalized communities, this loss amounts to the abandonment of due process under the law. To presume that everybody is guilty of something is to license responses that assume no need for proof; it undoes our system of justice by validating the notion that we know from the outset what guilt looks like. It enables a literal rush to judgment. It unleashes a killing instinct that shrugs at tragedy as “hindsight.”

The presumption of innocence allows for a moment of collective hesitation before we indulge the voices in our heads—the stereotypes as well as the archetypes that inevitably inflect a culture. It is the collective deep breath that allows us to imagine the humanity in each of us, the possibility of mistake. Crime happens. But despite the horrific rates of segregation, violence, incarceration and inequality at every stratum of our nation, we are not yet in a full-blown war against ourselves. To reorganize the structures and expectations of civil society as though we were, however, assures the same, and locks us into the unbreachability of a dangerously deepening divide.

Back in Brooklyn, demonstrators against New York’s stop-and-frisk policy have merged with those who mourn Kimani Gray. There have been calls—by a familiar cast of noisy people, disgruntled people, black people, poor people, weary people, people smelling of grief and despair—for sixteen days of street protest, a day for each year of Gray’s life. In response, police have erected barriers and nets to contain what they feel will be rioting and looting.

Leave a Comment

March 23, 2013 · 5:57 pm

Rosa Clark: The Unsung Legacy

by Patricia J. Williams

(A shorter version of this essay is published in the June 4, 2012 issue of The Nation Magazine, entitled “Anti-Intellectualism from Arizona to Michigan.”)

Recently, I found out that my work is mentioned in a book that has been banned from the schools in Tucson, Arizona. The anti–ethnic studies law recently passed by the state (Arizona Revised Statutes Section 15-112) prohibits teachings that “promote the overthrow of the United States government,” “promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” “are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” and/or “advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.” I invite you to read the book in question, titled Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic, so that you can decide for yourselves whether it qualifies.

In fact, I invite you to take on as your summer reading the astonishingly lengthy list of books that have been removed from the Tucson public school system as part of this wholesale elimination of the Mexican-American studies curriculum. The list may be found at http://azethnicstudies.com/banned-books.  The authors and editors include Isabel Allende, Junot Díaz, Jonathan Kozol, Rudolfo Anaya, bell hooks, Sandra Cisneros, James Baldwin, Howard Zinn, Rodolfo Acuña, Ronald Takaki, Jerome Skolnick and Gloria Anzaldúa. Even Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience” and Shakespeare’s The Tempest received the hatchet, deemed works that are “biased, political, and emotionally charged,” or where “race, ethnicity and oppression are central themes….”

Trying to explain what was offensive enough to warrant killing the entire curriculum and firing its director, Tucson School Board member Michael Hicks stated rather proudly that he was not actually familiar with the curriculum. “I chose not to go to any of their classes,” he told Al Madrigal on The Daily Show. “Why even bother?….I base my thoughts on hearsay from others.” Contrasting his sense of the relative dangers posed by Mexican-American studies as opposed to a curriculum that teaches the history of slavery, Mr. Hicks opined that ““Rosa Clark [meaning Rosa Parks] did not take out a gun and go onto a bus and hold up everybody…”

The situation in Arizona is not an isolated phenomenon. There has been an unfortunate uptick in academic book bannings and firings, made worse by a nationwide disparagement of teachers, teachers’ unions and scholarship itself. Brooke Harris, a teacher at Michigan’s Pontiac Academy for Excellence, was summarily fired after asking—merely asking–permission to let her students conduct a fundraiser for Trayvon Martin’s family. Working at a charter school, Harris was an at-will employee, and so the superintendent needed little justification for terminating her. According to Harris, “I was told…that I’m being paid to teach, not to be an activist.” (It is perhaps not accidental that Harris worked in the schools of Pontiac, a city in which nearly every public institution has been taken over by cost-cutting executives working under “emergency manager” contracts. There the value of education is measured in purely econometric terms, reduced to a “product,” calculated in “opportunity costs.”)  To read more about this case and to join the more than 200,000 others who have signed a petition asking for her reinstatement, you can go to: http://www.change.org/petitions/fired-for-teaching-about-trayvon-re-hire-brooke-harris-at-pontiac-academy-for-excellence

The law has taken some startling turns as well. In 2010 the Sixth Circuit upheld the firing of high school teacher Shelley Evans-Marshall when parents complained about an assignment in which she had asked her students in an upper-level language arts class to look at the American Library Association’s list of “100 Most Frequently Challenged Books” and write an essay about censorship. The complaint against her centered on three specific texts: Hermann Hesse’s Siddhartha, Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird and Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451. (She was also alleged, years earlier, to have shown students a PG-13 version of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.) The court found that the content of Evans-Marshall’s teachings concerned matters “of political, social or other concern to the community” and that her interest in free expression outweighed certain other interests belonging to the school “as an employer.” But, fatally, the court concluded that “government employees…are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” While the Sixth Circuit allowed that Evans-Marshall may have been treated “shabbily,” it still maintained that, “When a teacher teaches, ‘the school system does not “regulate” [that] speech as much as it hires that speech. Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her employer in exchange for a salary.’” Thus, the court concluded, it is the “educational institution that has a right to academic freedom, not the individual teacher.”

There are a number of factors at play in the current rash of controversies. One is a rather stunning sense of privilege, the confident sense of superiority that allows someone to pass sweeping judgment on a body of work without having done any study at all. After the Chronicle of Higher Education published an item highlighting the dissertations of five young PhD candidates in African-American studies at Northwestern University, Chronicle blogger Naomi Schaefer Riley wrote that the mere titles of the dissertations were sufficient cause to eliminate all black-studies classes. Riley hadn’t read the dissertations; they’re not even published yet. When questioned about this, she argued that, as “a journalist…it is not my job to read entire dissertations before I write a 500-word piece about them,” adding: “[T]here are not enough hours in the day or money in the world to get me to read a dissertation on historical black midwifery.” Riley tried to justify her view with a clichéd, culture-wars-style plaint about the humanities and higher education: “Such is the state of academic research these days.… The publication topics become more and more irrelevant and partisan. No one reads them.” This is not mere arrogance; it is the same cocooned, “white-ghetto” narrow-mindedness that allows Michael Hicks to be in charge of a major American school system yet not know “Rosa Clark’s” real name.

Happily, there is some pushback occurring against such anti-intellectualism. One of the most vibrant examples is a protest group called Librotraficante, or Book Trafficker. Organized by Tony Diaz, a Houston Community College professor, the group has been caravanning throughout the Southwest holding readings, setting up book clubs, establishing “underground libraries,” and dispensing donated copies of the books that have been removed from Arizona’s public school curriculum. You can donate by visiting http://librotraficante.com.

Leave a Comment

Filed under academic freedom, Arizona anti-ethnic studies law, banned books, Brooke Harris, critical race theory, education, free speech, librotraficante, mexican american studies, Michael Hicks, race, gender, class, ethnicity, Shelly Evans-Marshall, tony diaz

States of Exception

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 


The Real Injustice at the Heart of the Trayvon Martin Case

| April 18, 2012

At first there was near-unanimity of outrage and dismay. But in recent weeks, the polls reveal that Americans’ attitudes about the killing of Trayvon Martin have become starkly divided by race and party politics: eight in ten blacks say Martin’s killing was not justified, compared with just 38 percent of whites. Meanwhile, 56 percent of Republicans believe that there has been “too much coverage” in the media, as opposed to 25 percent of Democrats. There are plenty of theories to explain this shift, but surely one driver is that we seem to have stopped talking about the case itself and unconsciously substituted for it our usual litany of social anxieties.

It’s curious that so many discussions take an inevitable turn that is prefaced by: “Why aren’t we talking about…” The list of what we supposedly aren’t talking about is long and predictably partisan: gun culture in America; racially disparate rates of arrest and incarceration; “race card” playing; media as circus; statistics about “black-on-black crime”; school shootings as exemplary of “white-on-white” crime; “reverse racism”; high- and low-tech lynchings; Prohibition-era gangsters versus drug-prohibition-era “gangstas”; hoodies as exuding a nefarious life of their own; profiled presumptions-of-guilt as trumping constitutional presumptions-of-innocence; the propriety of shadowy organizations like ALEC crafting, funding and proselytizing for Stand Your Ground laws nationwide; whether Hispanics are white; and whether President Obama’s putative son does or does not look like Newt Gingrich’s putative son. These may be worthy issues, but they have drifted our focus away from how specific facts about the Martin case intersect with the specific peculiarities of Florida law. Given that George Zimmerman now faces trial, now is a good time to remind ourselves what this case is actually about.

Here’s the relevant text of Florida Statutes Chapter 776: “A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if: …He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Any person who does have such reasonable apprehension is “immune from criminal prosecution and civil action.” However, this immunity is not available to one who “initially provokes the use of force against himself or herself.”

Thus framed, the issues are relatively simple: Was Zimmerman’s belief that his life was in danger a reasonable one? Was his admitted pursuit of Martin “necessary to defend himself”? And did his admitted initiation of the encounter provoke use of force by Martin? These are questions of fact, now properly before a court of law.

What makes the case exceptional is neither race nor the politics of self-defense alone but rather the complete failure to prosecute—or even investigate—before now. Among the many flaws of Stand Your Ground, the standard of reasonable belief is not a warrant for total subjectivity. “Reasonableness” is an objective measure in the law; it refers to a public or community standard, not a privatized state of mind. The reason this case attracted such attention in the first place was the shocking complacency of the Sanford Police Department as enforcers of that standard.

Police failed to follow the most basic procedures for a homicide investigation: Zimmerman was never tested for drugs or alcohol, while Martin’s body was. After sticking him in the morgue, there was no attempt to identify Martin or to notify his family. This was not just sloppy and unprofessional; it flouted basic tenets of our jurisprudence. The police’s facile conclusion that there was nothing to contradict Zimmerman’s account is explicable only on one of two grounds: either they blindly deferred to the word of the confessed killer and thus abandoned any adherence to a community standard; or they instinctively shared Zimmerman’s vision, establishing being frightened to death by a young black man as a reasonable community norm.

Another strange feature of the current debate is the frequent assertion that because there were no witnesses to the shooting, there is “no evidence.” In fact, there is plenty: forensic reports about signs of struggle, the fact that Martin was unarmed, Zimmerman’s 911 call detailing intent to pursue Martin despite police exhortation not to, Martin’s phone conversation with a schoolmate, the voiceprint analysis of cries for help and, of course, Zimmerman’s catalog of at least forty-six prior calls to 911 to report a panoply of misplaced suspicions directed at unidentified others. The fact that this is “circumstantial evidence” does not render it a lesser kind of proof. Most crimes don’t come outfitted with cameras focused on the crime scene, after all, particularly homicides. Nearly all convictions are won by pointing to the irrefutable logic of a picture drawn from largely circumstantial bits and pieces of evidence.

Finally, there are those—particularly our friends at Fox News—who conflate the call for justice with a call to convict. This is a fundamental misapplication of civics. It’s worth repeating: what’s distressing about Martin’s death is that it took so long for his killer’s actions to be interrogated at all. Political philosopher Giorgio Agamben has observed that what distinguishes a state of exception is “not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension.” When law enforcement officers accept—without question—an admitted killer’s assertion that a homicide was justified because “he scared me,” they license open season. Without question.

Leave a Comment

Filed under "stand your ground" law, criminal law, due process, fox news, George Zimmerman, race, gender, class, ethnicity, trayvon martin

Culture of Death: Who Gets to Be a Person in Mississippi?

Patricia J. Williams 

The Nation Online,  blogpost of November 3, 2011 – 12:38pm ET, http://www.thenation.com/blog/164299/culture-death-who-gets-be-person-mississippi

On November 8, Mississippi is set to vote on Measure 26, a ballot initiative that would redefine the state’s Bill of Rights to extend the protections of personhood to include “every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning or the functional equivalent thereof.” It is striking that the measure, which is largely motivated by religious concerns about the sanctity of human existence, crops up in a state that has one of the lowest indices for overall quality of life—whenever it might begin—in the entire country: the infant mortality rate over the last decade is about 10 per 1,000 live births, with black babies dying at twice the rate of white babies. Mississippi leads the country in obesity and ranks forty-sixth in the number of state residents who have health insurance. It suffers from high death rates from cancer and heart disease. Twenty-three percent of the population lives below the poverty level, giving Mississippi the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last in the nation.

With the odds of survival so relatively skewed, it is no wonder that there might be some anxiety over preserving the very idea of life. Then, too, the legal category of “personhood” seems particularly capacious since Citizens United; if such a label protects corporations, banks and homeowners’ associations—and don’t they seem to be thriving!—what blessings might it extend to a zygote, that abstracted conception of future stock, human capital, mortal enterprise?

As I write, the seven billionth person is said to be entering this earthly dimension. That statistic has been reported with Malthusian apprehension, as well it might. The resources of the world are not infinitely replenishable; much of the planet’s ecology risks systemic collapse as a result of habitat degradation, global warming, invasive species and thoughtless exploitation; and the superpowers continue to go to war with one another over dismally non-sustainable energy sources like oil, gas and coal. Add in the uncertain-to-teetering economies just about everywhere, and it isn’t hard to fathom the dangerous contradictions of those who feel both deep resentment about the mad global competition to make ends meet, and simultaneously, a frantic “need” to propagate more of “our kind” because “we” are too few—regardless of actual numbers or common well-being. It’s as though we are walking a tightrope stretched between fetishism of the fetus and an abyss of human disposability.

When, during a recent Republican debate, the audience cheered the fact that Rick Perry had overseen more executions than any governor in modern history, there was at least a momentary shudder among the punditocracy. What did it mean that a numbered batch of bodies was cause for such applause? Perhaps this is the new metric for presidential success: executions and summary assassinations, as though the scales of justice were measured in people-poundage, with some being heavier or lighter, depending on strangely monetized equivalences. There have been too many events of late that have been framed by our political and media spokespeople as measured by some curious human exchange rate. Does the targeted killing of unindicted US citizens like Anwar Al-Awlaki and his 16-year old son “equal” resolution for the violence he may have preached? Does the grisly display of Muammar Qaddafi’s body flung in a refrigerated meat locker “account” for the lost lives in Lockerbie? And whether you deem the late Troy Davis guilty or innocent, his execution was a stark example of how much habeas corpus has been whittled away in recent years, his death an indirect product of curtailed access to judicial appeal and substantive justice—limitations that are justified with reference to “time spent,” and “tax dollars.”

Indeed, Davis’s legal representation was severely compromised by crippling cuts in state and federal funding for the Georgia Resource Center, which represented him and other indigent prisoners in post-conviction hearings. His appeal was also hobbled by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which prohibits prisoners from raising, post-conviction, evidence that they might have presented at trial, no matter how probative or substantive.

Embryos notwithstanding, we seem less and less invested in protections for the sanctity of life in the here and now. Can’t let things go on forever, after all. Costs a bundle.

Recently, the state of Texas decided to do away with the last meal for death row inmates, that terminal rite of agency, of choice, of taking leave of the sensory. From now on, the condemned will have to eat whatever hash is being dished up in the commissary. Of course, the tradition of granting requests in one’s last meal is premised on a superstition of sorts, a fiction of making peace, of showing mercy, of stilling spirit. In Louisiana’s Angola Prison, for example, the warden shares that meal with the doomed, a kind of final communion. In other places and times, a last drink or a coin to the executioner might serve as the bridge between life and impending death, a marking of the day as Unlike Any Other. The killing of a human being, whether considered legally justified or not, is momentous, mysterious, a repercussive tragedy no matter how reprehensible the record of that life. There will always be those who wreak havoc in society, and who then sneer from the grave or the brink of it; there is, no doubt, a very human urge to give them a little shove into the great beyond. But the entire purpose of just governance is to model respect and to provide restraint in the face of such urges.

When, instead, our government is viewed solely as something to protect “us” against “them” to the exclusion of it being a constitutive force as well, the social world turns into a zero-sum game, in which others’ success at survival means less for you. That mindset engenders a mean little flare of relief every time there’s news of one less ne’er-do-well post-born mouth to feed. That not-so-subtle channeling of emotion toward the facile rendering of death distracts us from the policy choices that might make life more tolerable—preventive healthcare, basic housing, public education—even in our unnatural numbers. It allows us to ignore the inconsistency between gracing the mute quiescence of a fertilized egg with personhood while failing to endow the more lively political quests of the American Dream.

Leave a Comment

Filed under death penalty, feminism, gender, last meal, mississippi measure 26, poverty, race, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, reproductive rights, the economy, troy davis, zero sum

The Legacy of Anita Hill, Then and Now

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 


Patricia J. Williams | October 5, 2011

Sad fact: there are few women of my generation who don’t have what is known as our “Anita story.” Mine occurred in 1980. I was five years out of law school and had decided to shift my career from practice to teaching. I was walking down a long hallway at the Association of American Law Schools meat market for new hires. There were two men behind me who were joking about the excellent shape of my legs and the unusually well-defined musculature of my lower quadrants. (Did I mention that it was a very, very long hallway?) At the end of that eternal passage was my appointed interview room. I escaped into it, only to be followed by the two. They, as it turned out, were doing the hiring.

Life was like that sometimes, I thought. And so I went through all the proper motions of expressing how much my fine ideas could contribute to their faculty, pretending that nothing had happened.

I didn’t stop pretending nothing had happened until 1991, when Anita Hill testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee about the unwanted office approaches of her boss, then-chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Clarence Thomas. I remember how still and dignified she was at the center of that howling hurricane of mockery, meanness and machismo. It was like some psychedelic cross between The Crucible and The Wizard of Oz, with its swirling fantasies of witchcraft, conspiracy theories and mad satyric orgies. I remember everyone from Orrin Hatch to Rush Limbaugh dismissing anything that “might have happened” as “bedroom politics,” even though Hill’s allegations centered on misbehavior in the boardroom, not the bedroom, and even though those allegations implicated precisely Thomas’s public ethics as the chief enforcement officer of sexual harassment laws. “He said, she said” entered the national vocabulary. So did “They just don’t get it.”

Anita Hill graduated from Yale Law School in 1980. The percentage of women in law schools was 38 percent—in contrast to the approximately
50 percent it is today. Back in those times there were so few women among the legal professoriate that many law schools didn’t even have women’s bathrooms. And as for women of color—there were only five or six of us teaching in the entire United States.

If the percentages of women in all professions improved over the next decade or so, the ability to speak up and speak out was often constrained by fear of losing status, ruining one’s career. It was the shockingly abysmal treatment of Anita Hill by the United States Senate that changed all that. Women were mobilized in a way unseen since the time of the suffragettes. EMILY’s List took off, as well as hundreds of networks for women’s political empowerment. Twenty years later, if some men’s behavior has not changed as much as one might have hoped, the collective women’s response has undergone seismic change. It’s not “nothing” anymore.

Anita Hill remains an icon to whom subsequent generations are rightfully indebted. At the same time, she has not remained trapped by her own symbolism or frozen in time. It is sometimes forgotten that she is a respected scholar of contract jurisprudence, commercial law and education policy. She is a prolific author, publishing numerous law review articles, essays, editorials and books. Today, Hill is a professor of social policy, law and women’s studies at Brandeis University. Much of her most recent research has been on the housing market, and her most recent book, published this month, is Reimagining Equality: Stories of Gender, Race, and Finding Home.

It is ironic that the full substance of Hill’s remarkable intellectual presence remains so overshadowed by those fleeting, if powerful, moments of her Senate testimony. If the larger accomplishments of her life aren’t quite as iconic as that confrontation with Clarence Thomas, they nonetheless merit attention by feminists and scholars alike. To begin with, Hill is a remarkably elegant and accessible writer. For those who wish to apprehend the gravitas of her intelligence and dignity, Reimagining Equality would be a good place to start.

Some will remember that Hill was introduced at the 1991 hearings in the company of a large family—she is the youngest of thirteen children—but very little attention was paid to the significance of that protective wall of humanity. It helps, through this book, to have met Mollie Elliot, Hill’s determined maternal great-grandmother, born into slavery in 1847. It is instructive to read about how her grandfather fled Arkansas in 1914, narrowly escaping an old-fashioned, low-tech lynching. It is inspiring to know that her mother, Erma Hill, would have been 100 years old on October 16, and that “each day I honor her by working to live up to her dream that I will find a more just America than the one she lived in and that, as she did, I will leave it better than I found it.”

Despite this, Reimagining Equality is not principally a memoir. The arc of “home” ranges from her ancestors’ efforts at making their Arkansas farm a secure geographic space to her own settling in Massachusetts as the homesteading of an identity even more than of literal place alone. This trajectory is accompanied by a brilliantly lucid detailing of the apportionment of American real estate—and along with it, the American dream—along the lines of race, gender and class. While the most memorable heroines of this book are women who struggle to make a safe and nurturing domestic space of their own, the underlying narrative antagonism is rooted in a universal story that affects us all—of corrupt, downwardly spiraling land and banking practices that have disproportionately targeted women, minorities and the poor. From the 1800s to today, Hill meticulously tracks notions of communities split by the government’s investment in racialized redlining of neighborhoods; of encompassing traditions of maternity riven by neonatalist notions about which mothers should be having more or fewer babies; and of “ghetto lending practices” that have poisonously metastasized into today’s bundled subprime mortgage crisis.

Reimagining Equality is an important achievement. Hill manages to humanize and reinvigorate the American promise of security in one’s pride of home—even against the backdrop of harder-edged, more militaristically inflected calls to “homeland security.” The kinder, gentler complications that Hill brings to bear in teasing out this contrast are an eloquent continuation of her giving voice to the invisible, the voiceless, the undocumented, the hopeless and, yes, the all too literally homeless.

In 1991, Anita Hill made history by the simple yet terrifically courageous act of standing up to an arrogantly gender-biased political culture, as well as that part of “the public [who] rejected the testimony of my life experience.” Twenty years later, let us make sure that her written legacy is no less remembered than Thomas’s radically right-leaning Supreme Court opinions. Let us honor her by fully recognizing the liveliness of her ongoing cultural engagement: the excavation of a resonant equality that shimmers at the heart of the American dream, a light that demands its place as a beacon to all Americans, and beyond.

 

Leave a Comment

Filed under abuse of power, anita hill, ethics, feminism, gender, housing, race, gender, class, ethnicity

Sex, Lies and The DSK Case

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 

Sex, Lies and the DSK Case

I’ve been to a lot of dinner parties lately where the question du jour is whether Nafissatou Diallo should have been “given her day in court” so she could “fully air” her charges against Dominique Strauss-Kahn; and, while we’re on the topic, whether Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. compromised his political career with the motion to dismiss. It’s slow around Labor Day, so I understand the hunger to have that case go on forever; it would have been a mega-spectacle, and I, too, would have loved seeing the blood vessels in Nancy Grace’s temples balloon and throb.

Carnival possibilities notwithstanding, however, it’s important to remember that criminal cases fall apart all the time. Through one prism, this was just one of them—such is life. At the same time, as Katha Pollitt noted recently in a post on The Nation’s website, the onus on a victim asserting rape is very, very great. It seems there’s always “something” in her past that can and will be used against her. In addition, the way l’Affaire DSK played with hot-button political figurations—money, race, ethnicity, immigration—made its end especially excruciating. Like a piñata that has spewed its contents after much bashing, a ghostly ruin of pluralized images were left to us: poor hotel workers, haughty Frenchmen, lying black women, callous prosecutors, Muslim mothers, high-priced lawyers, insidious unnamed sources, guys who smile like cats that swallowed the canary and traumatized rape victims everywhere.

It’s important to understand why this case fell apart, to distinguish some of its particular features from the more general challenges in prosecuting rape. First, rape cases are notoriously difficult to prove, because the crime is so often one-on-one, or “he said/she said.” In the past, the mere lack of other witnesses was considered legal reason for letting rape go unprosecuted. This is no longer true—and despite confusing media assertions to the contrary, Diallo’s case was not dismissed on those grounds.

Second, despite our best aphorisms that “even” prostitutes and pathological liars can be raped, it remains true that the credibility of rape victims is too frequently doubted for specious reasons having to do with their sexual history. Media accounts suggested that Diallo’s suit was dismissed because of her “questionable past,” but that wasn’t what weakened the case most. It was that she lied to prosecutors again and again and again. The fact that she falsely claimed on her asylum application to have been gang-raped in Guinea probably wasn’t enough to doom the case—she might still have presented herself quite sympathetically as a desperate refugee fleeing a war zone—but there were other things undermining her credibility. Diallo repeatedly confused or misrepresented crucial sequences of events to the grand jury, to police and to prosecutors. Not only did the police investigation turn up a jumble of discrepancies in her story; her own attorney permitted her, even advised her, to talk and talk and talk to all manner of tabloid media hounds. That rather unusual—I would say reckless—decision captured yet more discrepancies for the record and diminished her reliability further.

Third, where an accuser’s story becomes subject to documentable weaknesses on this great a scale, it’s the prosecutor’s duty to move for dismissal. What seems to be overlooked in calls to give Diallo “her day in court” is that our criminal justice system pursues cases in the interest of public order, not on behalf of an individual complainant. That’s why criminal cases are titled “The People” of a jurisdiction versus an alleged criminal actor. (A civil—or more “private interest”—claim, on the other hand, would allow “Ms. Diallo as an individual” to bring a case against “Mr. Strauss-Kahn as an individual,” and, given the lighter burden of proof in civil cases, would offer a better chance of winning such a suit.) Vance does not represent either “the police,” as so many seem to think, or Diallo, but rather the broad justice interests of the entire state; it’s the reason he was required to reveal the flaws in her story when the investigation uncovered them. If it’s exculpatory, the defendant has a right to know.

The responsibility of prosecutors to dismiss a weakened case is designed to be a filter of sorts. Not only would it be a waste of public resources to take questionable cases to trial; it would fundamentally challenge the very notions of presumed innocence and reasonable doubt. The prosecutor cannot—as a matter of absolute professional ethics—proceed to trial with a claim where the prime witness repeatedly changes or lies about relevant, substantive elements of the story. This is not a matter of discretion: prosecutors are forbidden from presenting a case to a jury when they do not believe they can win, as judged by the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

That said, the perceptions of prosecutors in determining who is a credible accuser are inflected by the same biases and assumptions that afflict the culture at large. When it comes to rape cases, data have shown that men are more often believed than women, and whites more than blacks, and fine suits more than sweatpants. Bad prosecutors make bad decisions about witness credibility all the time—and therein lie the grounds for our political advocacy, the reason to keep pressing for more educated participants at every level of the system, from police to prosecutors to judges.

We have plenty of reasons to be worried about the social divides that play out daily in our judicial system. But if there is bias at work in Vance’s handling of his office, this case isn’t the best proof. The wrenching demographics of misogynistic insult, assault and murder cannot alone determine the result of a given “case or controversy” (as our Constitution puts it). Putting them ahead of actual proof to seek vengeance against a “smugly smiling” icon of the banking industry is not so very different from carelessly assuming that a “scowling” black youth “probably” did it because he was wearing a hoodie. We cannot—should not—all be Nancy Grace.

Leave a Comment

Filed under cyrus vance, dominique strauss-kahn, ethics, nafissatou diallo, race, gender, class, ethnicity

Tiresias Unbound…


Patricia J. Williams | June 1, 2011

When my son was 2, he went to a nursery school where he often played with a cheerful little girl I’ll call Jessie. Jessie’s parents dropped her off earlier than most of the other kids, and she was in the habit of standing by the door as others arrived, taking their lunchboxes and helpfully lining them up in the classroom’s big old refrigerator. As my son and Jessie became better friends, he began to imitate her every move. Every morning Jessie would stand on the right-hand side of the door taking lunchboxes; my son would stand on the left-hand side taking lunchboxes; and they would take turns running to and from the large, battered fridge.

I remember this ritual of theirs, however, not just because they were so gosh-darned adorable. I remember it because one morning the classroom teacher smiled warmly as they went through their identical paces and said, “Your son is such a sturdy little security guard! And Jessie, she’s our mini-hostess with the mostest!”

That story came to mind when I read about Storm, the 5-month-old baby who has become the center of an international controversy because the child’s parents have refused to reveal Storm’s sex. Kathy Witterick and David Stocker sent an e-mail to their circle of friends, saying, “We’ve decided not to share Storm’s sex for now—a tribute to freedom and choice in place of limitation.” In no time, that message went viral, showing up on The Huffington Post as well as radio, TV and in newspapers throughout North America.

The public response has been overwhelmingly negative. Although Kathy Witterick’s follow-up letter in the Ottawa Citizen made clear that Storm’s immediate family knows the sex, and that there are no secrets withheld from Storm’s siblings, most people have found it strange, “creepy” or “freakish.” On The View, Elisabeth Hasselbeck called it “a social experiment.” Others called for the couple’s children to be removed by social services.

While it seems to me that “not sharing Storm’s sex for now” is hardly a full-fledged commitment to lifelong gender suppression or neutered identity, I will leave to mental health experts the propriety of Storm’s parents’ stance. As a purely philosophical matter, however, the situation is intriguing. After all, it is a much under-interrogated political truism that “we’re all just people,” or “we’re all equal” or “it doesn’t matter what your religion is” or “I don’t see race.” Who cares about anything else if “we’re all American citizens”?

Yet when some intrepid souls actually follow such identity-erasing truisms to their logical, uncomfortable ends—refusing altogether to engage in the conventions of gendered identity, as with baby Storm—it is profoundly unsettling. We’re not supposed to talk—to think—about difference based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion et al. But that supposition holds only when the marks, the phenotypes, the stigmas, are clear—indeed so clear that all conversation coagulates around the dynamics of denial: “I didn’t notice you were black—what a reverse racist you are for labeling yourself!” “Why can’t you be like everyone else instead of flaunting your religion by wearing that khimar, that yarmulke, that bindi?” “If women want equality in the workplace, they should stop demanding womb-based privilege.”

Where, however, there is ambiguity, a switch gets flipped. If race or ethnicity is at all indeterminate, the first question is “What are you?” Where gender is not instantly discernible, anxiety or even rage ensues. We want our boxes, our neat cabinets of thought. When crowing over a newborn and asking, “Is it a boy or a girl?” we are not really in search of sexological or biological truth—for most purposes, it doesn’t really matter at such a young age.  What we really are seeking with that question is the satisfaction of our own eagerness to assign gender. The instant we know, we run out to buy blue rather than pink or dolls rather than trucks. The pitch of our cooing goes up or down accordingly. Gender, rather than sex, is a social response, embedded in our language, culture, education, ideology, vision. When my son and his friend Jessie went through exactly the same motions, it was gender assignment that led their teacher to describe them in such unconsciously distinct ways.

Our anxiety in response to Witterick and Stocker’s decision reveals a tension in our culture between the insistence on pinning down unknown aspects of another’s identity and the assumption that we don’t need to know anything about anyone except that they’re human. Indeed, if there is “a social experiment” being done, it surely also tests those of us beyond the Witterick-Stocker household. Spoken or unspoken, assigning identity is something we are always doing—in fact, we need to do so as to order our world. Yet we almost always do so without giving one whit of thought to all the underlying histories of assortment we imply; perhaps taking the occasional time out to review is not a bad thing.

And so we must find some way to speak of this child. If we don’t want to call Storm “it”—and really, we don’t—we have to call Storm, well, um, Storm. All the time. No shortcuts. In English, there is no adequately humanizing yet universal pronoun, no general reference to common humanity; in order to speak comfortably, we automatically must yield to the partitions of him, of her, of gender. In the absence of pronouns, address necessarily becomes specific, individual, even intimate.

What would it mean if we were forced to hold in abeyance that foundering loss we feel when we encounter the limits of the known? What if we had to sit—just “for now”—with the uncertainty that exists beyond the bounds of the normative, the easily colloquial? What if we had to greet one another with such boundary-muddling specificity that the hostess in the security guard and the security guard in the hostess were made manifest? Perhaps we should bring less panic to that moment of liminality and instead hold ourselves open to the wealth of possibilities.


Leave a Comment

Filed under gender, race, gender, class, ethnicity

L’Affaire DSK

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 The Perp Walk That Demeaned Us All

Patricia J. Williams | May 24, 2011

When Dominique Strauss-Kahn first mulled over the idea of running for President of France, he professed concern that his vulnerabilities in the coming election would be the trifecta of “money, women, his being Jewish.” In the week since a housekeeper at New York’s Sofitel Hotel alleged that he assaulted and attempted to rape her, all three of those elements have converged to render any thought of a political future for Strauss-Kahn entirely beside the point.

On the surface, Strauss-Kahn’s troubles are all about “women.” He has long had a reputation for salacious advances. On one hand, therefore, it’s tempting to assume the present accusations fit him as “in character.” On the other hand, given his prominence and the seismic stakes for the European Union, his well-advertised randiness, in the opinion of many, renders him the world’s easiest fall guy.

On the surface, furthermore, the case can be framed as one individual charging another with sexual crimes, period. Strauss-Kahn has been arrested, pleaded not guilty, released on bail, put under house detention. Ostensibly, he will be presumed innocent until a trial allows all the facts to be presented in an orderly fashion, witnesses to testify, motives to be assessed, credibility to be evaluated, irrelevant and extraneous information to be barred from consideration.

Unfortunately, what has unfolded is not that simple. The international media frenzy has all but obliterated any space for a presumption of innocence; and it has relentlessly impugned both Strauss-Kahn and his accuser in broad, vulgar stereotypes—not only about sex, but about wealth, Guinean colonials, socialism, fame, French masculinity, American Puritanism, Muslim women, Jewish identity and Africans as bearers of HIV. It will be very hard to see justice done against a backdrop of so much roiling passion, rumor-mongering and pure projection. The deliverance of due process requires restraint, not just in the media but among the citizens of America and of the world. So I would like to offer some modest caveats as this case proceeds through the digestive tract of a world obsessed with celebrity dirt.

First, we do not know what happened. We can choose to believe what we want, but it serves no civic purpose to allow one’s personal hunches to stand in the way of being open to the specific evidence-based possibilities that will be presented in a court of law. For example, French intellectual Bernard Henri-Levy [1]’s publicly stated conviction that a proper first-class maid never cleans alone is spectacularly boneheaded. Even if it were true that housekeepers traveled only in “brigades,” it’s a generalization, a stereotype, irrelevant to whether DSK committed the crimes of which he is accused. At the same time, it is no less reflexively patronizing to conclude, as many women apparently have, that solely because the accuser is female or an immigrant or poor or Muslim or a widow that she could ever be anything other than truthful. And that is indeed all we know about her—that she is a poor Muslim widow from Guinea. Nor, of course, should we know much more about her identity, as a matter of due process. But, again, that process requires patience for victims’ stories to be played out in the appropriate place and time; it is not an invitation to plug the holes in our knowledge with bold imaginings.

Secondly, it is Dominique Strauss-Kahn who has been charged in this matter. It is not his wealth that is on trial, nor French effeteness or socialism or the International Monetary Fund. Rape and assault are committed by aggressors at every level of society—rich and poor—and on every continent. It is specious to opine, as did Ben Stein [2], that DSK couldn’t have done it because he’s a fat, old man and, besides, who ever heard of an economist being a rapist. It is just as specious to assume that he must have done it because all French men are supposedly sexist pigs. And it is nothing less than distressing to see racist speculation in the blogosphere that the accuser is “another Tawana Brawley”; or Ann Coulter’s twittered sneer that “DSK’s accuser is Muslim, he’s Jewish, so now DSK is claiming that he raped in self-defense.”

Thirdly, none of these observations preclude a clear, and clearly separate, analysis of misogyny in French or American political culture. Indeed, it’s well past time for French women to ratchet up the debate about their relative lack of representation in the highest echelons of power. The DSK affaire has elicited so much offensive commentary from prominent French personalities that an ironically nominated “marche des salopes” (or “slutwalk”) was organized in Paris to protest the prevalence of institutional gender bias. The casually medieval rationalizations for priapic behavior that have dropped from the mouths of the intelligensia are positively cringe-worthy: “le droit de jambage” (the right of the leg), “le droit de seigneur” (the right of the lord over his servant’s wife), “le troussage de domestique” (the right to fumble under the skirts of the help) and “un petit viol sympa” (a friendly little rape).

Fourthly, while it is better not to indulge in conspiracy theorizing, it is also good not to rule it out as impossible. Politics is a complicated, dirty business, as the impeachment hearings of President Clinton ought to have instructed us. (Who guessed back then that Newt Gingrich, while skewering Clinton’s morals, was cheating on his then-wife with his present wife?) For Americans, who by and large have never heard of DSK, the possibility of his arrest being a set-up is inconceivable. But in the immediate aftermath of his detention, a majority of French citizens believe he has been purposely brought down. Why? Dominique Strauss-Kahn was well on track not just to become France’s president but its first Jewish president. As head of the IMF, he led that institution in a distinctly progressive manner. He sharply critiqued corrupt American bankers and banking practices and, early on, predicted the collapse of the mortgage market. As a center-left Socialist party member, he was close to negotiating a European Union bailout for Greece. And his elimination from the election empowers the candidacy of Marine LePen, head of the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic National Front party, whose popularity, alarmingly enough, currently polls higher than that of Nicolas Sarkozy.

Finally, we should curtail the unseemly expressions of glee many American commentators have found in DSK’s lowered status. Rather than just condemning the crimes for which he has been indicted, the media condemns him for his wife’s inheritance; for his Porsche; for being a limousine liberal or a caviar socialist; for “pretending” to “spread the wealth” while wearing “$35,000 suits”; for flying first class; for having large and multiple homes; for owning more than one cell phone; and for being effetely French (Bon Dieu, we seem to hate the French!). A columnist in the Daily News derided [3] DSK’s very bearing because he “swung his arms as if he were striding down a corridor of power.” The New York Post went on to describe him as a “whiney fat cat,” the “jet-setting” “darling of the French left” who exudes “pompous arrogance.” According to the Post’s sources, “Cops ‘are not thrilled by the French idiot…’ ”

There’s an element of sadism in this sort of reporting that is troubling—rather like the partying at Osama bin Laden’s death. One doesn’t have to defend Strauss-Kahn’s alleged actions to reflect upon what reveling in his humiliation—the exuberant fun some people are having—says about us. While imprisoned on Riker’s Island, for example, there was a good bit of gloating about DSK’s having been “forced to cool his heels in the lockup,” as the NY Post put it. “The dingy digs, where prisoners are allotted $1.80 per meal, were a far cry from the $3,000-a-night luxury suite….”

No doubt. But that gap in accommodations says nothing about individual guilt or innocence. It does, however, reveal a deep resentment about class. At the same time, that bit of datum both highlights and obscures the alarming conditions in our jails and prisons, to say nothing of the way that class is also a cipher for race. Riker’s Island, one of the largest penal colonies in New York—or the world—has a daily population somewhere between 13,000 and 14,000. Most of those are pre-trial detainees, and 92 percent are black or non-white Latinos. In other words, the inmates at Riker’s Island are not convicts for the most part: they are arrestees waiting for trial. But because they are poor and cannot afford bail, the average length of their stay is fifty-one days [4].

The public mockery of DSK’s having to endure, for a couple of nights, the wretched toilets, the meager food, the “dingy” surroundings misses a deeper point: that there are thousands of other presumptively innocent-until-proved guilty people languishing in Riker’s stinking conditions whom we are also mocking, rendering invisible or summarily deeming deserving thereof. The too-easy revulsion at their poverty or race is in perfect counterpoint to the infuriated huffing about DSK’s fortune and nationality.

This concern is most efficiently symbolized in the indignities of the so-called “perp walk.” To American audiences, it’s become an unthinking ritual of police practice—parade the deliciously dastardly defendants. See Lindsay Lohan without her makeup! Mel Gibson with his eyes crossed! Charlie Sheen with a manic film of sweat! The French press was deeply unsettled to see their former finance minister dragged through a forest of photographers, rumpled, handcuffed and red-eyed. Some French analysts saw it as a kind of democratizing gesture, a bracing reminder that elites need to be taught that they’re just like everyone else. But I think the perp walk—a relatively recent product of voyeuristic reality TV shows like Cops—is undignified and humiliating for all defendants.

We should remember the great mistakes made in the name of perp walks: the Innocence Project has exonerated hundreds of defendants who “looked” guilty based on questionable metrics like “shiftiness.” When the prosecutor called DSK’s exit from the hotel the behavior of a man in a hurry, for example, NY Daily News columnist Michael Daly mused, “This is what you would expect your basic sex criminal to do.” For those of us old enough to remember the Central Park Jogger case, this is very close to the kind of generic categorization that allowed the jury to convict despite the thinnest of circumstantial evidence; and it was nearly two decades before those young men were finally exonerated by DNA evidence.

Hence, the perp walk is a social equalizer all right, but not in a good way. It’s a shaming ritual, rarely performed upon middle-class arrestees, and much more often upon the extremes of the class spectrum: either highly visible figures whose images may be sold at platinum prices to the likes of People magazine, or poor non-white denizens whose dark unhappy images evoke shock and horror in service to what author Michelle Alexander calls “the New Jim Crow.”

Given the fact that the United States—with more than 2 million bodies behind bars—leads the entire world in rates of incarceration, the perp walk is hardly the greatest icon of equal rights. It might be a wiser course if we think seriously about whether such habitual indignities might not endlessly and further instantiate a downwardly corkscrewed presumption of guilt that ultimately indicts us all.

Leave a Comment

Filed under ben stein, bernard henri-levy, charlie sheen, dominique strauss-kahn, ethics, feminism, gender, le front national, lindsay lohan, marine le pen, mel gibson, perp walk, race, gender, class, ethnicity, sarkozy

Zero Sum Games

Is Anti-White Bias a Problem? 

A new study says whites think discrimination against them is a bigger problem than anti-black bias. Is this surprising?

5/22/11 10:29 PM

When Prejudice Is So Malleable – Room for Debate – NYTimes.com

http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-white-bias-a-problem/when-prejudice-is-so-malleable

Room for Debate: A Running Commentary on the News

When Prejudice Is So Malleable

Updated May 22, 2011, 10:05 PM

Patricia J. Williams is the James L. Dohr Professor of Law at Columbia University. She writes the column “Diary of a Mad Law Professor,” which appears monthly in The Nation.

[This piece is part of a roundtable responding to a study by Michael I. Norton and Samuel R. Sommers, "Whites See Racism As A Zero Sum Game That They Are Now Losing."  It is published in the journal Perspectivs on Pyschological Science.  The online version can be found at http://pps.sagepub.com/content/6/3/215.

The finding that white Americans see blacks’ progress as an insult or a diminishment of their status is not entirely surprising. Zero-sum formulations of prejudice tend to emerge in lean economic times, fueling cultural or historical rivalries of all sorts. I have a hunch that if the study had included questions about whether whites feel threatened by “reverse racism” among Asians, Latinos and immigrants, the results would be much the same. Those perceptions notwithstanding, data show that white Americans remain the most privileged human beings on the planet.

The world is changing, however, and the realignment of wealth, power, jobs and resources has been deeply challenging to the notion of American exceptionalism. That exceptionalism, consciously or unconsciously, is infused with racialized hierarchies — normative whiteness and masculinity still marking the “worthiest” inheritors of the American dream. Moreover, the downturn in all our fortunes has been relentlessly and poisonously exploited by certain segments of the media. The language of “us” versus “them” dominates far too much of our radio and television discourse. The litany of scapegoats who are supposedly fouling “our” trough includes not just blacks but those of Mexican, Japanese, Korean or Hawaiian descent, non-born-again Christians, the entire People’s Republic of China, Canadians, the French, liberal elites and the elderly.

The trickiest thing about prejudice is that it is so malleable, so capable of reinvention. Susan Fiske, a professor of psychology at Princeton, has documented the varied and fluctuating presentations of social biases like race, class, disability, gender. She points out that there are nuanced differences in how prejudice is expressed against the disabled as opposed to Asian-Americans, or as against high-status blacks versus poor blacks, or the homeless or those with low-status accents. Elements like pity, resentment, competition, revulsion, paternalism, or fear play against one another in complicated ways.

Fiske employs a grid to predict how social groups will be ranked, using attributed vectors of warmth/coldness and competence/incompetence. In the simplest terms, her metric is as follows: 1. Those stereotyped as high competence and high warmth are met with pride and admiration (like most white people). 2. Groups who rank as high warmth and low competence are treated with pity, sympathy, paternalism (like the elderly). 3. Those stereotyped as high competence and low warmth are met with envy (like Jews and Asians). 4. Those perceived as low competence and low warmth are greeted with contempt, anger and resentment (like the homeless).

Through much of American history, blacks have been viewed as low on the competence index (negative feelings), but warm enough to be pitied (which is usually felt not as a negative but a protective, “pro-black” fuzzy emotion). As blacks have made greater symbolic strides in the last few decades, that ranking seems to have shifted: there is envy, suspicion, resentment — despite numbers, despite empirical documentation to the contrary — that blacks are “taking over” as the recipients not of due process but of undue “favoritism.”

This projected fear is a danger to the nation. For all the gains of the civil rights movement, blacks remain among the poorest, most segregated and most unemployed of all Americans. There can be no commonweal when such grim reality is invisible to white fellow citizens who are driven instead by fantasies of competitive victimhood. A house divided cannot stand.

Leave a Comment

Filed under affirmative action, race, gender, class, ethnicity, zero sum

Raising Hell…

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 


The Tiger Mama Syndrome

Patricia J. Williams | February 3, 2011

Amy Chua does not hold the patent on prejudice. There are lots of ways to spin a stereotype, and that she calls herself a “Chinese” mother in her hotly debated book on parenting, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother, plays well against cultural anxieties about American economic status. But for heaven’s sake—the woman was born in Illinois!

No doubt that Chua and her daughters have put in the requisite 10,000 hours it takes to be fluent in any subject, but the Ivy League is chock-full of accomplished people who put in such hours. They come from all over the United States and all over the world. Some growing percentage of them are the products of yuppie, buppie, narcissistic helicopter parents—hockey dads, stage moms, the kind of people who would rather see their child drop dead of heatstroke while running a race than see that child give up. Like Chua, they do so in the name of all sorts of higher values—family honor, Catholic guilt, team spirit, Texan bragging rights, Jamaican superiority, Jewish destiny, women’s equality, Norwegian sang-froid, black pride, Hindu nationalism, immigrant striving, Protestant ethic, true grit. The world is a queasy, uncertain place right now, and what it takes to compete in the rat race exposes our kids to ever-increasing rates of depression, mental illness and substance abuse.

That said, the Ivy League is also home to a much larger group of people who work hard, who love their chosen pursuits, who are happily well-adjusted, yet who did not acquire their highly effective study habits by being turned out into the snow when they were 2 years old—a form of “discipline” Chua brags about. Some of them are even Chinese. Likewise, there are many Ivy Leaguers who do not believe that their accomplishment makes them less “American” or “Western.” They don’t spend time worrying, as Chua does, that if they “feel that they have individual rights guaranteed by the US Constitution” they will be “much more likely to disobey their parents and ignore career advice.”

So let’s not spend too much time wondering why Chua assigns her neurosis to her Chinese-ness rather than to her aspirational American upper-middle-class-ness. What I find more intriguing is not so much her obsession with academic success but her pathological yearning for dominance, control, standing and respect. Chua does not just want perfect scores; she is desperately afraid that she and her daughters will be drowned in the chilly goop of what she endlessly refers to as “decline.”

Chua’s fears are not confined by race, ethnicity or personal effort alone. After all, in Greece and France students have been rioting because of the rising costs of a good education and the paucity of jobs. In Akron, Ohio, an African-American tiger mother named Kelley Williams-Bolar was recently prosecuted for lying about where she lived so she could get her children into a decent school district. In California, immigrant kids of Mexican parents are battling for the right to pay in-state tuition at public universities. In Memphis there are fights about whether integrating a poor school district with a wealthier suburban one would constitute a “theft” of education. In London, a woman named Mrinal Patel was accused of fraud for misrepresenting her address so as to qualify her child for a better school. There are few places, in other words, where people are not worried about the quality of life and distribution of resources on a crowded planet.

At the same time, if Singapore, China and Hong Kong are producing a greater number of students with musical proficiency and excellent test scores, it’s because they have made huge public investments in education. They make musical instruments available to students—as the United States once did in the first part of the twentieth century. They have teachers certified in the subjects they teach—as was the case in Russian schools during the Sputnik era. “Westerners” are not nearly as lacking in work ethic as Chua maintains; but you don’t get to Yale if your elementary school has no books. You don’t rank first in the world in science if, as in the United States, 60 percent of your biology teachers are reluctant to teach evolution—and 13 percent teach creationism instead.

It would be so deliciously convenient if calling your kids “garbage”—another parenting trick Chua boasts about—actually turned them into little engines that could. But our larger educational crisis will involve a public investment that simply does not correlate with shooting down the self-esteem of children or disrespecting the “Western-ness” of the parents who struggle to raise them.

Finally, Amy Chua exhibits an excruciating self-consciousness about how she is seen in a racialized public imagination. She is riddled with angst about not betraying her status as a “model minority” who’s “supposed” to be smart in music, math and science. She even “disciplines” one of her daughters by threatening to adopt a “real” Chinese kid. Even as her narrative is swaddled in Dragon Lady analogies, every line is inflected by very American prejudices and divisive ethnic generalizations. Indeed, if you take away the peculiarly manic quality that is Chua’s alone, her anxieties are no different from a lot of “buffer” groups whose inroads on the edges of assimilation mark them, and whose successes are watched reproachfully, jealously by the larger society. The Kennedys walked this walk for the Irish. Fiorello La Guardia complained of it when he was the “breakthrough” Italian. Condoleezza Rice’s and Michelle Obama’s parents toiled and pushed for them in ways typical of a generation of civil rights babies. In other words, this tensely, needily overachieving mentality is hardly unique. It is not necessarily or even probably generated from Chua’s romanticized motherland. Our collective dilemma, and the most poignant challenge presented by her book, is how to survive in a world where the slightest nonconformity risks landing you outside—of a home, of a job, of a life—and left to stand by yourself, alone in the freezing cold.


 

Leave a Comment

Filed under amy chua, battle hymn of the tiger mother, book review, class, education, family, feminism, gender, race, gender, class, ethnicity, the economy, women